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The following questions describe the scope of this paper. When decision trees are
used to analyze optimal decisions, should end nodes be evaluated on the basis of
QALYs or on the basis of healthy-years equivalents? Which measures should be used
in communications with others, e.g., patients? Which of these measures incorporate
risk attitudes, and which do not? It is demonstrated that the healthy-years equivalent
measure does not stand scrutiny. Key words: utility; QALY; quality of life; healthy-years
equivalent; standard gamble. (Med Decis Making 1996;16:207-214)
In recent articles on medical decision making, a
lively debate has arisen around the healthy-years
equivalents (HYEs) advanced in 1989 by Mehrez and
Gafni.l-9 A conclusion of this paper is that the claims
of these authors regarding HYEs do not stand scru-
tiny.
All the discussions of HYEs in the literature have
assumed the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of
expected utility, so this paper also does so in the
main body of the text.“’ Therefore, it first explains
the general expected-utility theory. Quality-adjusted
life years (QALYsl  are described as a specified ver-
sion of expected utility, and general principles for
the choice between general and specified models
are explained. “Counterexamples” and “preference
reversals,” advanced by Gafni et al. in defense of
HYEs, are based on no other argument than the sim-
ple fact that HYEs  are more general than QALYs.
Then we turn to the comparison of HYES and time
tradeoffs (TTOs). Several authors have explained that
HYES yield the same results as TT0 questions under
expected utility theory. It is explained that Gafni
et al. thought otherwise because of a misunder-
standing of the riskless-value/risky-utility difference
and of the “degeneracy principle” of expected utility.
Ambiguity in Gafni and colleagues’ writings about
the risk-neutrality assumption for healthy life years
has led to misunderstandings in criticisms of their
work. Depending on the ambiguity, either HYEs vi-
olate the empirical finding of risk aversion, or they
are simply a restatement of general expected-utility
theory where no information about risk attitudes is
recorded in the HYEs. Under violations of expected
utility, HYEs do not lead to alternative rationality the-
ories because they apparently invoke violations of
transitivity and continuity. Empirically, the presently
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existing evidence suggests that HYE elicitations in-
corporate larger -measurement errors than do TTO
elicitations.
General Expected-utility Theory
Outcomes are assumed to be health profiles in
this paper. A health profile describes a time period,
designating the life duration of the patient, and spec-
ifies for each time point the health state of the pa-
tient. An example is the health profile denoted by
(hoarse, 5 y r  + mute, 5 yr), where the patient lives
for ten years, and during the first five years her voice
is hoarse; during the last five years the patient is
mute. A chronic health profile is one where the
health state of the patient is the same until death.
(Q, L) designates a chronic health state of L years of
life in health state Q. In this paper we restrict atten-
tion to positive health states, i.e., for each health
state we assume that longer life durations are always
valued higher. This is not essential to the conclu-
sions of the paper but simplifies some formulations.
Next we incorporate risk into the model. A typical
notation is ((Q1, 71, 0.4; (Q2, 41, 0.61 for a medical
treatment that with probability 0.4 results in seven
years of life in health state Q1, and with probability
0.6 in four years of life in health state Q2. The term
gamble designates such probability distributions
over outcomes, i.e., over health profiles. The nota-
tion for a general gamble is
(X1, p1; * * * ; X”, PJ
where pl, . . . , pn are the probabilities and the out-
comes X,, . . . , X, are health profiles.
“Degenerate gambles” are gambles that do not
entail risk, but with certainty result in an outcome.
For instance, the “gamble” ((mute, Ll, 11 with cer-
tainty results in a life duration of L years without
speech. Such gambles are included in the domain
of the theory (Keeney  and Raiffa,11 Formula 5.21. Be-
cause this is a central point in the discussion below,
it is emphasized: degeneracy principle o f ex-
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pected  utility . The von Neumann-Morgenstern ex-
pected-utility theory also governs choices between
degenerate (“riskless”) gambles.
Under von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-util-








Here, U denotes the utility function that values out-
comes. Expected utility immediately implies that
preferences are transitive, i.e., if a first gamble is
preferred to a second, and the second to a third,







For most applications, the expected-utility model
is considered too general, and specific assumptions
are made about utility. For instance, utility is as-
sumed to be a member of a parametric family so
that only the parameters need to be assessed, or
utility is assumed to be decomposable in some trac-
table manner. The next section discusses some spe-
cific assumptions concerning utility.
.65/ - - - - - - - ( H e a l t h y ,  1Oyr)
(Q”5) - L  Death
Figure lc .35
QALYs,  and General
versus Specified Models
FIGURE 1.  Utility independence. By utility independence, the in-
difference in figure lb is implied by the indifference in figure
la. The preference in figure lc is discussed by Mehrez and
Gafni.
This section shows how the QALY model can be
obtained as a specification of expected utility. For
the general QALY approach, two specifying assump-
tions are made for the utility U. These are:
1. Additive decomposability over disjoint time per-
iods
That is to say, the utility U(hoarse,  5 yr + mute, 5
yr) can be written as a sum U(hoarse,  5 y r )  + U(mute
in years 6, . . . , l0), where the latter term describes
the utility contribution of the years 6 to 10 in the
health state mute.
.
2. Utility independence of life duration and health
state
This condition refers only to utilities for chronic
health profiles, and implies that utility can be writ-
ten as a multiplicative form, i.e.,
of the life duration that is combined with.* By nor-
malization, V(M) = 1 for the maximal life duration
M, and W(Q) = 1 for the optimal heaith state Q =
healthy.
An implication of utility independence for stan-
dard gambles is’ depicted in figures la and lb: As
maximum life duration, we take ten years; hence we
set W(lOy19 = 1. If in figure la indifference (denoted
by -) results for the probability 0.65, suggesting that
W(QJ = 0.65 for ‘state of health Q1, then in figure lb
indifference should also result for the probability
0.65. In other words, it should not matter for the
elicitation of WCQJ whether the health states are
combined with a life duration of ten years or with a
life duration of five years. (Figure lc is used later, to
discuss an example of Mehrez and Gafni.) The pref-
erence conditions that characterize the above spec-
ifications are discussed in further detail by Blei-
chrodt.12
U(Q,  L) = W(Q)*V(L)
where V(L) depends only on the life duration L ir-
respective of the corresponding health state Q, and
W(Q) depends only on the health state Q irrespective
The above two assumptions define the general
QALY model as a specification of expected utility. In
QALY calculations, a third assumption is usually
added, i.e., it is usually assumed that all life years
*Formally, additive models W(Q) + V(L)  can also occur under
utility independence. They, however, can not accommodate the
special role of 0 years of life, where the health state should not
matter, and therefore are not mentioned in the text.
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have the same value, so that V(first year) = - - - =
V(tenth  year). This can be characterized by risk neu-
trality with respect to gambles for life duration.
Then V(L) = L can be taken for all life durations L
(it is now more convenient to drop the normaliza-




W(hoarse) * 5 + W(mute) * 5 (1)
It is quite obvious that the additivity assumption
over disjoint periods and the utility-independence
assumption, as well as the risk-neutrality assump-
tion, cannot be perfect empirical descriptions.
Hence, even if a person perfectly well satisfies ex-
pected utility, then still the QALY calculations some-
times prescribe preferences contrary to the actual
preferences. The QALY assumptions are at best
satisfied approximately. The advantage of the as-
sumptions is, however, that they greatly simplify the
measurement requirements, because fewer mea-
surements are needed to assess the utilities of gen-
eral health profiles. For example, in the QALY
model, utilities need be assessed for chronic health
states only. They uniquely determine the utilities for
all health profiles. Also, separability of utility simpli-
fies the integration into Markov models. Whether
the greater tractability of analysis outweighs the loss
of empirical realism is a question that cannot be
answered in a universal manner; the answer de-
pends on context and application.
This section presents the healthy-years equivalent
(HYE) idea of Mehrez and Gafni,l and discusses it.
HYE, the definition.  Mehrez and Gafni follow the
approach of the main body of this paper by basing
their analysis on expected utility. We continue de-
noting the utility function by U. The HYE for an out-
come, e.g., (hoarse, 5 yr + mute, 5 yr), is defined as
the number of years in perfect health that has the
same U value as the outcome. For example, if
U(hoarse, 5 yr + mute, 5 yr) = U(healthy, 9.5 yr )
then
HYE(hoarse,  5 yr + mute, 5 yr) = 9.5 yr
For measuring HYEs, Mehrez and Gafni propose a
two-stage scheme. Thus, from the two indifferences
(hoarse, 5 yr + mute, 5 yr)
- (healthy, 10 yr), 0.97; (death), 0.03 (3)
and
(healthy, 10 y-14, 0.97; (death), 0.03
- (healthy, 9.5 yr) (4)
It should be understood that the trading off of
greater tractability versus loss of realism is an issue
in all empirical fields, and always occurs when a
choice is to be made between more and less general
models, or more and fewer free parameters.4 This
issue is central in multiattribute utility, where spe-
cial forms of functions are conjectured primarily for
being tractable,” or for the “nonexpected-utility”
models in risk theory, where an increase of empir-
ical realism is obtained as compared with expected
utility, but in return many convenient methods of
expected-utility analysis then must be abandoned.
Hence, an argument for a more general model that
emphasizes the gain in empirical realism only is not
very interesting (compare Gafni and Zylak,13 second
paragraph), as is a criticism that does nothing but
discuss the loss in tractability. Similarly, hypothetical
examples to demonstrate that preferences under the
restrictive model can deviate from true preferences
if the latter can be anything under the more general
model are tautological and do not provide new evi-
dence. Only when the pros and cons are considered
jointly, in relation to the domain of application, can
sensible choices be made between more and less
general models.
they infer that HYE(hoarse, 5 yr + mute, 5 y r )  = 9.5
yr. Indeed, as the right side of equation 3 is the same
as the left side of equation 4, substitution of expected
utility in the described indifferences implies that
equation 2 holds. In general, for any health profile,
Mehrez and Gafni in a first stage use a standard
gamble to find a lottery over the best and the worst
available outcomes that is indifferent to the health
profile. Then, in a second stage, they elicit the num-
ber of years in full health (the HYE)  indifferent to the
lottery found in the first stage. This procedure was
first described for chronic health profiles only,’ then
applied to general health profi1es.l4
Mehrez and Gafni advance as the main advantage
of HYEs  that  they do not depend on the restrictive
assumptions from the Q A L Y  model. Measurement of
HYEs does not require an additive evaluation of dis-
joint time periods or utility independence, but in-
vokes only the principles of expected utility. Mehrez
and Gafni argue that HYEs:
are based on expected utility;
incorporate risk attitudes;
are fairly simple to measure; and
have a meaning that is intuitively appealing.
l 209
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We next turn to a first criticism of the HYE idea.
HYE questions are formally equivalent to TTO
questions. A first criticism, expressed by several dis-
cussants of HYEs,  is that the measurement of HYEs
can be s i m p l i f i e d . 2 , 5 , 7 , 8 , 1 5 - 1 7 If one considers the in-
differences in equations 3 and 4, then by transitivity
the indifference between (hoarse, 5’yr  + mute, 5 yrl
and (healthy, 9.5 yr) follows. It is easier to immedi-
ately ask for the number of years in perfect health
that provide indifference to the health profile under
consideration. Thus one immediately elicits the in-
difference
(hoarse, 5 yr + mute, 5 yr) - (health,  9.5 yr)
Such direct elicitations are standardly used in the
TTO method. Thus, the criticism proceeds, the HYE
measurement procedure that Mehrez and Gafni
proposed is nothing but a roundabout manner for
asking TTO questions.
In response to this criticism, Mehrez and Gafni6
present the following example. (The same example
and argument were also published elsewhere.? As-
sume the following three indifferences.
(dial.un., 15 yr) - (healthy, 15 yr), 0.7; (death), 0.3
(5 )
(healthy, 15 yr), 0.7; (death), 0.3 - (healthy, 8 yr)
(6)
(dial.un., 15 yr) - (healthy, 11 yr) (7)
The first two indifferences reveal that
HYE(dial.un.,  15 yr)  = 8 yr
The third indifference reveals that
TTO~dial.un.,  15 yr)  = 11 yr
The theoretical analysis that Mehrez and Gafni pro-
pose for these choices is as follows. In choice situ-
ations of risk, the person conforms to expected util-
ity, and the identity
U(dial.un., 15 yrl = U(healthy, 8 yrl (81
is revealed by the first two indifferences. In riskless
situations, however, the person maximizes a “value”
function V that  may very well be different from the
risky function U. So the third indifference reveals
the identity
V(dial.un., 15 yrl = V(healthy, 11 yr) (9)
Mehree and Gafni emphasize that their example is
meant to fully agree with expected-utility theory.
However, it does not. By the degeneracy principle,
expected utility also governs choices between risk-
less options. If U(dial.un.,  15 y-14  = U(healthy, 8 yr),
then in the TT0 question the person must express
indifference between (dial.un., 15 yr)  and (healthy, 8
yr) and the third indifference is excluded.
The error underlying Mehrez and Gafni’s ideas.
The conclusion of the following discussion was also
obtained by Loomes.15 To justify the indifferences in
equations 5, 6, and 7, leading to equations 8 and 9,
Mehrez and Gafni invoke the “value-utility” theory
that assumes a difference between risky utility func-
tions and riskless value functions. The best-known
papers about this theory may be those of Dyer and
Sarin18,19;; indeed, Gafni et a l . 9 , 2 0 have invoked these
references. Let me emphasize that the theory is en-
tirely within the realm of expected utility.
As an example to illustrate the theory, assume
that, for a maximum life duration of 25 years, the
value function for healthy life years is V(,x y-r) = x/
25; hence it is linear. The utility function for healthy
life years is the square root of VcU yrl, i.e., Utx yr =
Ml. Both functions assign value 0 to 0 years and
value 1 t o 25 years, and are monotonically related,
i.e., they order the certain outcomes in the same
way (longer life durations are preferred). The differ-
ence between the two functions is in the ordering
of differences. In the riskless context, the V-differ-
ence between 25 years and 16 years is V(25  yr)  -
V(16yr ) = 0.36, which is the same as the V-difference
between 9 years and 0 years. In the risky context,
however, the U-difference between 25 years and 16
years is TJ(25yr)  -  U(16yr)  = 0.2 , which is smaller
than 0.6, the U-difference between 9 years and 0
years.
The value-utility theory has been developed to dis-
tinguish, within the framework of expected utility,
risk attitude from the riskless valuation of prefer-
ence intensities. For instance, in the above example
it can be claimed that the (riskless)  valuation of pref-
erence intensities for life duration is linear so that
there is constant marginal value, but still in risky
decisions the utility function is not linear (linear =
risk neutral) but concavely curved, in agreement
with risk aversion. The value-utility theory does fully
agree with expected utility, and does not permit vi-
olations of expected utility, as in Mehrez and Gafni’s
example. A phenomenon such as that described in
equations 8 and 9 is not permitted in this theory. U
and V must order the riskless outcomes in the same
way, and U is necessarily a monotonic transform of
V; U and V are “ordinally identical.” 1 1 , 1 8 , 1 9
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Gafni et a1.6,99 used the terms “isovalue curve” and
“isoutility curve” to designate sets where the value
function, and the utility function, respectively, are
constant. As we have just seen, isovalue and isoutility
curves must  be identical. The most-studied case of
the value-utility theory is where U is a power of
V.2 1 - 2 5  The possibility that two functions can order
riskless outcomes in the same manner and still be
different has not always been recognized by Gafni
et al.t
In summary, value and utility are distinct because
they order differences of riskless outcomes differ-
ently, rather than riskless  outcomes themselves.
Other problems for Mehrez and Gafni’s distinction
between risky and riskless choices. It has been dem-
onstrated above that the theory of Mehrez and
Gafni, distinguishing between risky utility and risk-
less value in an ordinal manner, deviates from ex-
pected-utility theory. That by itself does not neces-
sarily mean that their theory is without interest.
However, on closer study, their theory violates basic
principles of rationality. As pointed out by many,
choices such as those in equations 5, 6, and 7 con-
stitute a violation of transitivity. A second problem is
that the theory leads to violations of continuity, i.e.,
if one gradually changes a risky choice situation into
a riskless one, then in the limit as the amount of
risk approaches 0, counterintuitive preference re-
versals can occur. For brevity I do not elaborate on
this claim.
HYEs  do not incorporate risk attitudes. It will now
be demonstrated that the risk attitude that is indeed
inherent in the first stage of the HYE-measurement
procedure exactly cancels out in the second stage.2.5
Gafni et al. contest that claim.3,6,9 Assume, to that ef-
fect, that two decision makers order riskless out-
comes in the same manner, but have different risk
attitudes. Because TT0 questions involve only risk-
less outcomes, the two decision makers then pro-
vide the same replies to the TTO questions. We saw
above that the replies to TTO questions coincide
with HYEs; therefore, their HYE values are also iden-
tical. Thus, H Y E s  cannot, for a given ordering of risk-
less outcomes, distinguish between different risk at-
titudes, and any effect of risk attitude in the first
stage of HYE measurement must be neutralized in
the second stage. Let us, to avoid any ambiguity,
consider some mathematical conclusions that can
be drawn at this stage.
TThis  occurs most clearly in Mehrez and Gafni’  (page 288,
next to last paragraph). See also Mehrez and Gafni’ (equation 4;
the relevant point is properly mentioned in Footnote $ there)
and Gafni et al.’ (page 331, lines 13-14). Discussions in Mehrez
and Gafni’ (page 147, second paragraph) and Mehrez and Gafni”
(page 1282) do point out that cardinal (rather than ordinal) mea-
sures of outcome are relevant, but use this to criticize QALYs
and TTOs, respectively, and not HYEs.
THEOREM 1
Under expected utility, HYEs are identical to
TT0 replies. Consequently, if two expected-util-
ity maximizers have the same riskless prefer-
ences but have different risk attitudes (i.e., their
preferences in gambles differ), then they have
the same HYE values. Hence, HYEs  do not in-
corporate risk attitudes.
The above theorem shows that TTOs  and HYEs do
not incorporate risk attitudes, and that risk attitudes
cannot be derived from them without additional in-
formation. This is contrary to the claims of Gafni
et al.’ The main assumption of expected utility un-
derlying the above reasoning (besides the domain
assumptions entailing the degeneracy principle) was
transitivity of preference, and the specific integral
form of expected utility was not used. Hence the
TTO and HYE values are not only independent of
the risk attitudes of persons under expected utility,
but, even stronger, they do not depend on expected
utility, and also hold for transitive “non-expected-
utility” generalizations of expected utility. A similar
observation was made by Loomes.15 This observa-
tion provides negative answers to the research ques-
tions proposed at the ends of some papers.3,6,9
HYEs  cannot be used in decision-tree calculations.
Another issue concerns the question whether HYEs
are meant to be used in decision analyses. That is,
can the expected number of HYEs  be an index for
evaluating medical treatments, as the expected
number of QALYs evaluates medical treatments in
the QALY model? This implies risk neutrality for
healthy life years, as the HYE of any health profile
(L y-r, healthy) is L. Gafni et al. write in many places
that HYEs fully represent individuals’ preferences,’
and that HYEs should be used instead of QALYs or
utilities. Studies in diagnostic radiology have used
HYEs in this way to analyze the use of ionic versus
nonionic  contrast media.” In several of their
publications, Gafni et al. have suggested that they
indeed intend HYEs  to be used in this manner
(“equate the HYE with utility”).1,14
Based on the mentioned works of Gafni et al., dis-
cussants have criticized HYEs for the assumed risk
neutrality for healthy y e a r s . 5 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 7 However, Mehrez
and Gafni” contradict the claim5 that the HYE ap-
proach assumes risk neutrality for healthy life years.
Mehrez and Gafni6  (equation 1 )  state that HYEs  as
such should not be used in an expected-utility anal-
ysis, but should be transformed into utilities and
only then used to calculate expectation. Gafni27 crit-
icizes QALYs with risk neutrality for violating the
commonly-found risk aversion, although this criti-
cism seems to be directed to risk neutrality for
nonperfect-health years only. Confusion resulting
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from the two interpretations of HYEs  (with and with-
out risk neutrality for healthy years) underlies other
criticisms.7,8,15 ?:
The version of HYE theory that transforms HYEs
into utility values simply reduces (after deletion of
its erroneous parts) to the general expected utility
as described above, where no restrictive QALY-like
assumption has been added. In other words, this
version of the HYE theory has nothing new to offer
and should not be given a new name. The version
of HYE theory that assumes risk neutrality for
healthy years runs into the additional problem of
not being empirically realistic, because risk aversion
is the common  empirical finding.
The calculation mistake in Example 2 of Mehrez
and Gafni.1 Let us, finally, consider Example 2 of
Mehrez and Gafni,1(end o f  p . 1 4 6 )  which has given rise to
much discussion. Mehrez and Gafni consider there
the assumption that true preferences deviate from
the assumptions of the QALY model (the QALY
model includes, in this discussion, the assumption
of risk neutrality). Obviously, this assumption is log-
ically equivalent to the existence of examples where
one treatment is preferred according to true pref-
erences, and the other treatment according to the
QALY model. For clarification, Mehrez and Gafni
suggest their Example 2 as a hypothetical numerical
example to illustrate such a “preference reversal,”
where the true preferences differ from the QALY
preferences. Unfortunately, a calculation mistake
slips in in their example.
 The mistake is illustrated in figure 1. Mehrez and
Gafni claim that the QALY model would derive from
the indifference in figure lc that the quality weight
for health state Q 1 be 0.65. A comparison with fig-
ures la and lb shows what the mistake is? figure
1c is an unfortunate mix of figures la and lb. ‘The
QALY model does conclude both from the indiffer-
ence in figure la and from the indifference in figure
lb that the quality weight for Q 1 is 0.65. Notice here
that in both figures, the same life duration appears
to the left and the right sides of the indifference sign
(10 yr in figure la and 5 yr in figure lb), as it should
be. In figure lc, however, the left life duration of 5
years as in figure lb has been combined with the
right life duration of 10 years as in figure la. The
indifference in figure lc contradicts the indiffer-
ences in figures la and lb, and by the QALY model
contradicts a quality weight of 0.65 for Q1 as claimed
$4lso,  some critics of HYEs  seem to assume that the HYE ap-
proach adopts other assumptions from TT0 calculations, such
as valuation of health state Q through the quotient X/Y [from  an
indifference (Q, Y) - (H,  X)1, or other assumptions from QALY
calculations. To my knowledge, such assumptions have never
been made for HYEs.
by Mehrez and Gafni.3  The calculation mistake is,
by itself, not a very serious issue, of course. What
must be regretted, however, is that Gafni et al.6,9 do
not acknowledge their calculation mistake.
Do HYEs " fully represent individual’s preferences?”
Theorem 1 above demonstrates that HYEs  do not
represent risk attitudes, such as the commonly
found risk aversion. Therefore, they cannot “fully
represent individuals’ preferences,” contrary to
claims to the contrary.’
Another, related, misunderstanding may concern
the following point. One can generalize HYEs  in
such a way as to incorporate risk attitudes, and, in
effect, the whole preference structure of a person.
We call these values “extended” HYEs.ll  The proce-
dure is as follows. For each gamble, the extended
HYE is defined as the number of healthy years equiv-
alent to the gamble. So HYEs are then defined over
all gambles, rather than only over sure outcomes.
Then one gamble is preferred over another if and
only if it has a higher extended HYE value. For ex-
tended HYEs, the claim of full representation of in-
dividuals’ preferences (including risky choices) is
justified. Here lies, however, also the disadvantage
of extended HYEs. Recording the information con-
cerning extended HYEs  comes down to recording
the whole preference ordering. A model that de-
scribes reality by simply repeating every aspect of
reality explicitly, without providing any convenient
summary, is not useful. Therefore, extended HYEs
cannot replace utilities in decision analysis.
HYEs can be useful in communication. If one de-
scribes to non-specialist lay-persons, such as most
patients, the value of a medical  treatment in terms
of its expected utility value, the laypersons will not
understand. A lay-person knows the meaning of 9.5
years in perfect health, but does not know the mean-
ing of 0.97 utility. Expected utility is a theoretical no-
tion that has no direct empirical meaning. It is
therefore easier to express the value of a medical
treatment in terms of the equivalent number of
healthy years, i.e., the HYE. For this purpose, the
HYEs  are useful.”
Notice here that, for optimal decision making, the
decision analyst should retain the full information
of the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM)  utility
functions. It is easy to transform utilities into HYEs,
as explained above. However, as implied by Theo-
rem 1 above, transforming HYEs  into vNM utilities
§The original text of the example could be interpreted in two
ways, leading to two different preferences that would both lead
to a calculation mistake. Gafni et al.6,9 state that they intend the
example as it is depicted in figure lc.
IReferences  5 and 17 use the expression “certainty equivalent
number of (healthy) years.”
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is not possible: If one has recorded all the HYE val-
ues for all health profiles, then one does not possess
information about risk attitude and cannot retrace
the associated vNM utilities. This analysis shows that
storing information in terms of HYEs, instead of in
terms of vNM utilities, is an unfortunate choice by
which the information about risk attitudes is lost.
This is contrary to claims by Gafni et a1.1,6
Empirical Performance of HYEs:
Dropping the Theoretical Assumption of
Expected Utility
The main body of the paper presents, in line with
the discussions in the field, a theoretical analysis of
HYEs, based on rationality principles. That way we
find that HYEs  are identical to TTOs, and that this
identity is based mainly on the transitivity condition.
However, eliciting utilities from patients is a descrip-
tive activity, and rationality principles are violated
descriptively. For instance, the probability-equiva-
lent version of a standard gamble and the certainty-
equivalent version should give identical utility func-
tions according to expected utility, but in reality it is
generally found that the probability-equivalent
method gives higher values.28 This section addresses
such descriptive issues.
On the basis of phenomena such as those de-
scribed above, it can be expected that in empirical
investigations differences will be found between the
information elicited by direct TTO questions and by
the two-stage procedure advocated by Gafni et al.
This does not yet justify their approach. For that, an
empirical theory and explanations should ‘be pro-
vided for the deviations from rationality that occur,
and it should be explained why the two-stage
method provides better protection against such de-
viations. Such theory and explanations have not yet
been offered by Gafni et al., who reiterate that their
ideas are intended to be based on expected utility
theory. For instance, Mehrez and Gafni1,p.145 state ex-
plicitly that their ideas are not motivated by the em-
pirical deviations from rationality. They claim3,p.168
that one has to follow the measurement procedures
that coincide with expected utility if one accepts ex-
pected utility as the normative standard. (This is
contrary to the view that one should correct elici-
tations  for systematic descriptive deviations from the
normative theory. 1
At any rate, I expect that the two-stage approach
of Gafni et al. will not provide better empirical re-
sults than TTO questions, but, on the contrary, will
only generate additional errors and distortion be-
cause of its more complicated nature. (Such an ex-
pectation has been expressed before.? There is
some empirical evidence available in the literature
HYEs  as Outcome Measure l 213
that supports that conjecture. It has been found that
for the probability-equivalent method adopted in the
first stage of the two-stage measurement procedure
proposed by Mehrez and Gafni, response-mode ef-
fects lead to overestimation of the probability values
(enhancing risk aversion)29,30 For the certainty-
equivalent questions asked in the second stage, re-
sponse-mode effects lead to overestimation of the
certainty equivalents (reducing risk aversionl.29,30
These two effects both increase the observed HYE
value. Thus, the deviations from transitivity, i.e., the
factors to generate differences between the stages of
the two-stage approach of Gafni et al., do not cancel
but reinforce each other. This predicts that HYEs
observed by means of the two-stage procedure of
Gafni et al. lead to strong overestimations, stronger
than those obtained using TTO observations.
Conclusion
Under expected utility, as assumed by Mehrez,






The two-stage approach to elicit HYEs is a round-
about way for measuring TTO values.
The two-stage approach does not elicit risk atti-
tude; Gafni et al. thought otherwise because they
did not understand that expected-utility theory
also governs riskless choices and that in the
value-utility theory, riskless value functions and
risky utility functions order outcomes in the same
manner.
The greater generality of HYEs as compared with
QALYs is not a virtue per se (“proved” by Gafni
et al. through their “counterexamples”), but must
be weighed against the loss of tractability.
If risk neutrality is assumed for healthy life years,
then this assumption deviates from empirical re-
ality.
If no risk neutrality is assumed for healthy life
years, then the HYE model is not new, but is sim-
ply the general expected-utility model.
If expected utility is not assumed, and the two-
stage approach to HYEs is tested empirically, then:
6. The two stages enhance errors and lead to over-
estimations of the HYE values that are stronger
than those found with direct TTO questions.
Finally,
7. For communication purposes, HYEs  seem to be
a useful tool.
